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Securitizing ‘climate refugees’: The futurology 
of climate-induced migration 
Andrew Baldwin, Chris Methmann, Delf Rothe 
Abstract: This paper serves as the introduction to this special issue in Critical 
Studies on Security. It begins with a brief overview of the academic debate and policy 
context concerning climate change and human migration. The principal claim is that 
critical evaluation of the security dimensions of climate change and migration must 
begin with the epistemological challenge that knowledge about climate change and 
human migration is speculative and future-conditional. This introductory piece then 
provides short synopses of each paper included in the special issue.   
Keywords: climate change, migration, security, future 
Climate change and climate-induced migration are futurologies. Climate change had 
long been discovered scientifically prior to it becoming fully materialised or even be 
experienced. Throughout the 19th century, the early heroes of climate science, Svante 
Arhenius, John Tyndall and the like, discovered the theoretical possibility of 
atmospheric warming through the release of carbon-dioxide into the atmosphere. Yet 
these early pioneers of climate science lacked the means to actually corroborate their 
hypothesis. It was not until the 1950s that this became possible as measurements on 
Mauna Loa in Hawaii confirmed that CO2 emissions had indeed significantly 
increased, which in turn led scientists to connect the fact of CO2 emissions to global 
temperature rise (Lövbrand and Stripple 2011). Yet even today, most of our 
knowledge about climate change are predictions based on a vast scientific machine 
(Edwards 2010). As the 2°C target demonstrates, climate policy is predicated on 
future scenarios, and the same holds true for the debate about climate-induced 
migration. The origins of climate-change induced migration discourse go back to the 
1980s, when concerned scientists and environmental activists argued that unchecked 
environmental and climate change could lead to mass displacement (Mathews 1989; 
Myers 1989). However, at that time, hardly any actual climate or environmental 
refugee could be detected. Even today, almost three decades later, the term as such 
remains merely a theoretical possibility but not an actually-existing, clearly-defined 
group of people. Stories of both climate change and climate-induced migration are 
almost entirely written in the future-conditional tense (Baldwin 2012). 
Thus far the debate about climate-induced migration has been dominated by its 
futurology. It has led to the question of whether or not predictions about 
climate-induced migration are true, how many climate-induced migrants will have to 
be expected, and how the consequences of climate change will interact with other 
drivers of flight and migration. Answers to these questions have piled up as a 
remarkable body of literature, divided by a stark line. This line is drawn between the 
 2 
so-called “maximalists” – those who cast sometimes alarming numbers about future 
climate refugees – and “minimalists” – those who dispute quantitative reasoning by 
highlighting the complexity of the issue (Suhrke 1994). Today, it seems that at least in 
academia the minimalist argument has largely won the day. For example, in what is 
by far the most authoritative scientific account of the relationship between climate 
change and human migration  The Foresight report on Migration and Global 
Environmental Change, it is argued that  
the range and complexity of the interactions between these drivers [of migration] means 
that it will rarely be possible to distinguish individuals for whom environmental factors are 
the sole driver’ (Foresight 2011:9) 
Yet even while the maximalist-minimalist debate has been settled, at least for now, 
another set of arguably more pressing epistemological questions has largely been 
ignored. These questions also result from the futurology of climate-induced 
migration and the fact that our knowledge and practices about climate-induced 
migration are mostly speculative. How has this knowledge come into existence? What 
are the techniques, assumptions, values etc. that underpin it? And what are the 
politics of this knowledge? How does the way we think about climate-induced 
migration influence the way we propose to govern it? The articles gathered together 
in this special issue ask precisely these intersecting questions.  
And these questions are all the more important given the fact that the phenomenon 
of climate-induced migration has now entered the arena of high politics, where it is 
regularly framed in the language of security. On the one hand, climate-induced 
migration is a recurrent theme in climate negotiations, deployed by developing and 
small-island countries as well as NGOs and activists to highlight the costs of inaction. 
A case in point represents the underwater cabinet meeting of the Maldive 
government, initiated by the NGO 350.org in the runup to the Copenhagen climate 
summit 2009. 1  In 2010, the UNFCCC COP 16 agreed the Cancun Adapation 
framework, calling for ‘measures to enhance understanding, co-ordination and 
co-operation with regard to climate-change induced displacement, migration and 
planned relocation, where appropriate’. Migration is also a dominant theme in the 
recently published Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC 2015), which suggests that migration can be an effective 
means for adapting to climate change. On the other hand, however, migration 
continues to play a crucial role in the securitization of climate change. Since the early 
2000s, climate change has been framed as a security issue. It has been discussed in 
both the UN Security Council (UN Security Council 2007b) and the UN General 
Assembly (UN Secretary General 2009). It features in many national security 
strategies (Brzoska 2012), and even the Pentagon has commissioned a study on the 
                                                          
1 The Guardian, October 7, 2009, available online at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/07/maldives-underwater-cabinet-meeting, 
last accessed 2014-01-17. 
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issue (Schwartz and Randall 2003). So too many security-related NGOs and think 
tanks have sought to highlight the security implications of global warming (for 
example CNA Corporation 2007; WBGU 2007), a point of view which also finds 
widespread resonance in popular culture as evidenced for example by Al Gore’s huge 
cinematic success, An Inconvenient Truth, and is his subsequent receipt of the Nobel 
Peace Prize. And within this debate, climate-induced migration has become a sort of 
shorthand for describing the security implications of a warming climate. Migration is 
often used to underpin the plausibility of claims that climate change leads to 
instability, and is thereby reified into an actually-existing phenomenon. For example, 
in a speech in Berlin in 2013, US President, Barak Obama warned of “new waves of 
refugees” by climate change. So too Al Gore referenced climate-induced migration in 
his Nobel lecture, stating that “climate refugees have migrated into areas already 
inhabited by people with different cultures, religions, and traditions, increasing the 
potential for conflict.”2 Climate refugees and migrants are also frequently referred to 
in the two debates on climate security in the UN Security Council (UN Security 
Council 2007a; UN Security Council 2011).  
Given the importance of climate-induced migration in climate security discourses, we 
thus approach the futurology of climate-induced migration from the angle of 
securitization theory, broadly understood. Scholars from International Relations and 
beyond use this approach to understand how dangers, threats and risks are 
constructed and influence politics. In this volume, we feature both the Copenhagen 
School (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1998) and the Paris School (Balzaq 2010) of 
securitization (for this distinction see Trombetta in this volume) as well as 
Foucault-inspired approaches that seek to understand security biopolitically (e.g. 
Aradau and van Munster 2007; Dillon and Reid 2009). While these approaches differ 
considerably, they are united by the insight that the various ways in which threats 
and risks can be constructed are relevant for the politics that are designed to cope 
with the problem (Campbell 1992). This common interest in the security implications 
of different types of discourse and knowledge about climate-induced migration are at 
the centre of this special issue. The remainder of this introduction contextualises the 
special issue by providing historical background to the debate on climate change and 
migration and situating the contributions within this ever-expanding debate. 
The historical background of climate-induced migration 
As Etienne Piguet recently argued, the story of environment and migration is one of 
‘a strange disappearance and sudden reappearance’ (Piguet 2012). The original 
founders of migration research considered environmental change to be a significant 
driver of human mobility. But as the field matured, and the complexities of migration 
became evermore apparent, the environment faded into the background. However, 
                                                          
2
 http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/gore-lecture_en.html 
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when global environmental change became more widely popularised in the 1980s, 
environmentally-induced migration suddenly reappeared on the agenda. And yet 
what is so striking is that this emerging debate was almost entirely disconnected from 
existing migration research. 
This was mostly due to the fact that the debate was driven primarily by concerned 
scientists and environmental activists who wanted the issue of environmental change 
to be tackled more seriously and with more political ambition. Throughout the 1980s, 
about a context in which security was undergoing significant redefinition(Ullman 
1983), the Oxford biologist Norman Myers (1986) and Jessica Tuchman Mathews 
(1989), then president of the World Resources Institute (WRI), argued for 
acknowledging the security dimensions of environmental change. A United Nations 
Environment Programme study on environmental migration tried to put more flesh 
on these argumentative bones, for the first time substantiating such claims in what is 
now one of the founding texts in the contemporary policy debate on environmental 
change and migration (El-Hinnawi 1985). In 1988, Jodi Jacobson (1988) published 
what later became a widely read study on environmental refugees for the Worldwatch 
Institute., arguing that 
[t]he vision of tens of millions of persons permanently displaced from their homes is a 
frightening prospect, one that could rival war in its effect on humanity. The growing 
number of environmental refugees is perhaps the best single measure of global 
environmental decline. (Ibid.:2) 
This early discourse coalition, which revolved mainly around US-based 
environmental NGOs, argued that environmental change was to become a major 
driver of migration, which in turn could result in conflict. This argument was echoed 
in some academic circles notably the Toronto group and the work of Thomas 
Homer-Dixon, who sought to prove a relationship between environmental change, 
conflict and migration and warned, among others, of ‘waves of environmental 
refugees’ (Homer-Dixon 1991:77). Robert Kaplan’s infamous essay The Coming 
Anarchy would later popularize these ideas. Even US President Bill Clinton confessed 
to be ‘gripped’ by this discourse (Hartmann 2006). And finally, in 1995, Norman 
Myers and Jennifer Kent (1995) published their seminal study entitled Environmental 
Exodus, which argued that by 2050, there could be almost 200 million 
environmental refugees. In the ensuing years, this number was referenced in a range 
of publications on the issue, and  even today it is regularly cited as an unquestioned 
fact (for an overview see Jakobeit and Methmann 2012). In contrast to previous 
decades, the environmental migration agenda had returned in full force, although 
this time it was no longer dominated by migration research but by environmentalists. 
It should come as no surprise that the bluntness of these early claims and predictions 
provoked disagreement. Richard Bilsborrow (1992) wrote a background report on 
environmental migration for the World Development Report, arguing that the debate 
was for more complex than suggested by those dominating the agenda with alarmist 
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claims. Astri Suhrke (1994) later critiqued the maximalist position but without ever 
denying the possibility of displacement through climate change. This view was 
echoed years later by Richard Black (2001) who claimed  
that although environmental degradation and catastrophe may be important factors in the 
decision to migrate, and issues of concern in their own right, their conceptualisation as a 
primary cause of forced displacement is unhelpful and unsound intellectually, and 
unnecessary in practical terms. (Black 2001:1) 
Although the maximalist and minimalist positions are regularly used to frame the 
debate about environmental change and migration, the minimalist position seems to 
gaining prominence in international policy circles.  This is partly because the 
minimalist critique resonated with the human security discourse which also began to 
emerge in the mid-1990s. In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme 
published a study on human security which sought to shift the object referent of 
security discourse away from the nation state towards the individual (UNDP 1994). 
This approach sought to marry security and development discourse and pointed to 
the complexities of insecurity, among them the interaction between social, political 
and environmental factors. Jon Barnett (2001) and Simon Dalby (2002) translated 
this approach to the field of environmental security. They argued that deterministic 
claims about the relationship between environmental change, instability and 
migration were implausible as conflict and mobility were complex socio-ecological 
phenomena. This shift remains highly influential across large parts of today‘s 
research on climate change and migration. 
With the turn of the millennium climate change received renewed attention in 
political and academic circles. As Mike Hulme (2012) has argued, climate change 
became the ‘synecdoche’ for environmental change. It began to represent 
environmental degradation in general. This was also reflected in the debate about 
environment and migration, where concern focused on the issue of climate-induced 
migration. Notably, Myers’ and Kent’s numbers from 1995 gained new attention and 
became popular among those debating the issue. NGOs and international 
organizations published studies concerned with the issue, and scholars initiated 
large-scale research projects. Michael Nash, an acclaimed film-maker, created a 
documentary called Climate Refugees that launched with huge success in 2007. 
NGOs and some governments from small island states such as the Maldives 
organized public events dramatizing the disappearance of their homelands. 
Climate-induced migration became a hot topic.  
Within all the recent attention given to climate-induced migration, a number of 
things are quite striking. First, there is a strong disconnect between popular 
representations of the issue and the way in which it is viewed by policymakers and 
academics. Most academics have become very leery of quantitative predictions.  This 
is not to say that they would deny the severity of climate change impacts. Rather, it 
seems that the minimalists have largely won the academic debate. The authoritative 
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Foresight Report concludes that environmental and climate change is only one factor 
among many that drives migration and that it is embedded into complex 
socio-economic and political contexts (Foresight 2011). As some of the contributions 
in this special issue attest, this new consensus seems to be closely associated and 
consistent with the notions of human security and resilience, which suggests that 
these ought to be key terms through which to assess the political consequences of 
climate change-induced migration discourse. 
This contrasts, though, with large parts of the public and political debate. 
Documentaries such as Climate Refugees are still driven by an alarmist tone, and the 
high estimates that had long been criticized for being methodologically unsound 
remain still prominent in political assessments. For example, the 200 million climate 
refugees cast by Myers and Kent in 1995 are still widely cited, for example in the 
influential Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern 2007:77). 
President Obama’s Berlin speech mentioning ‘waves of climate refugees’ cited above 
precisely echoes the words of Homer-Dixon, the influential alarmist, from two 
decades ago. And as was noted earlier, climate-induced migration has become a 
shorthand for climate security concerns in general, and it thus features prominently 
in the securitization of climate change. 
It is this gap between the acknowledgement of uncertainty about climate-induced 
migration and its alarmist prominence in discourses about climate security that 
points to the starting point of this special issue. Climate-induced migration seems to 
be more present than ever before in policy circles and in popular media. What can we 
make of this contradiction? This question is inherently political inasmuch as 
demands we account for the way security threats and risks are politically constructed 
in the face of uncertainty. 
The contributions 
In the first contribution, Julia Trombetta provides a brief overview of the different 
theoretical approaches to securitization relevant for climate-induced migration. In 
particular, she discusses the relationship between the Copenhagen and the Paris 
schools, or ‘securitization’ vs. ‘insecuritization’. While the Copenhagen school focuses 
on authoritative speech acts that stage an issue as a security issue, scholars following 
the latter tradition highlight the everyday and mundane practices that create a sense 
of insecurity upon which certain political practices can then be mounted. Trombetta 
argues that both approaches are relevant for the study of climate-induced migration, 
at least in the case of the European Union. Climate-induced migration is securitized 
by authoritative speech acts which declare migrants a threat. However, one cannot 
analyze climate-induced migration without the securitization of migration in general, 
which seems to follow the logic of insecuritization described by the Paris school. And 
this combination points to an often overlooked problem in the securitization of 
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climate-induced migration. As Trombetta (2014) puts it, “even if some of the appeals 
to consider environmental migration as a security issue call for environmental 
measures and solidarity, these measures have to be implemented in a context in 
which migration is considered as a security issue and governed accordingly.” (p.?) 
Her conclusion highlights the fact that securitizing climate-induced migration with 
even the best intentions in mind can fuel a traditional security logic that is dominant 
in the field of migration in general. Based on this insight, she calls for a cautious 
deployment of the notion of human security so prominent in the study of 
climate-induced migration as ‘human security discourses hide different problems, 
not only because they tend to disempower people involved but also because human 
security is turning into a strategy to govern at distance keeping people in places‘. 
 
For her part, Ingrid Boas cautions against generalizing these insights to the rest of 
the World. She provides an example of how Western concern with climate-induced 
migration fails to resonate with actors in the South. Boas highlights that the 
discourse about climate-induced migration is mostly a Western discourse. In line 
with Trombetta’s argument that security discourses often follow a deeply ingrained 
logic, she argues ”that precisely because of the predominant Western character of the 
discourse, many of its core ideas are rejected by the Indian societal elite” (p?). They 
simply don’t fit with the dominant environmental and security discourses in India. 
However, Boas does not stop there. She investigates the ideas that underpin the 
Indian state’s view on the climate-security nexus and shows that it partly intersects 
with Western discourses about climate-induced migration. She finds, first, that 
India’s discourses about climate security are driven by ‘softer concepts of security’. 
Second, ‘other issues (such as economic migration, energy security, or even internal 
climate migration) are given much higher priority. The role of possible climate 
migration from Bangladesh is far less prominent than often assumed in Western 
discourses. Boas thus points a nuanced picture of Southern views and experiences 
that is often lacking in Western accounts.  
Methmann and Rothe is based on the Mediterranean, yet with a rather different focus 
than Boas and Trombetta. The aim of their article is to trace the visual construction 
of climate-induced migration in this area. They start from the insight that all 
knowledge about climate-induced migration is speculative. They argue that while it is 
almost impossible to verify that someone is a climate refugee, nowadays it is also 
impossible not to see climate refugees, given how frequently they appear in policy 
reports, documentaries, charity advertisements and in testimonials for political 
campaigns. Thus the authors go about analysing the political implications of this field 
of visibility of climate-induced migration. In particular, they show that mapping 
techniques picture the entire Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as a hot spot for 
climate-induced migration. This space is then populated with images of 
climate-induced migrants that are depicted as racialized and passive victims. 
Together with the image of climate change as potentially apocalyptic normality in this 
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region, MENA is produced as a dangerous ‘smooth space’ that threatens the ‘striated 
space’ imposed by the European Union. This distinction, drawing on Deleuze and 
Guattari, enables Methmann/Rothe to tease out the political implications of this field 
of visibility. They suggest mainly two implications: the necessity to kill with targeted 
military and humanitarian interventions, and the reliance on the resilience of the 
people in this smooth space. Their analysis resonates with the work of Gregory White 
(2011) who argues that North Africa functions as a security buffer for Europe, and 
provides some important insights about the way in which the space of North Africa is 
rendered governable in the wider context of climate change adaptation.  
The next two contributions align well the conclusions that Methmann and Rothe 
draw. Giovanni Bettini focuses on the emergence of resilience in climate-induced 
migration, while Julian Reid investigates some of the biopolitical dimensions of 
climate change and migration discourse by accounting for notions of life and death. 
Bettinis starting point is the recent ‘de-securitization’ of the debate as expressed in 
the emergence of the notion of human security, and most recently, resilience. Bettini 
traces the way that climate-induced migration has been reframed from a problem 
into a solution, a means to adapt to a changing climate. Yet analysing recent 
publications on climate-induced migration by NGOs, governments and international 
organisations, Bettini highlights that this shift towards ‘milder tones’ does not 
necessarily result in a ‘democratization’ of the debate. Drawing on Foucault, he shows 
that especially the notion of resilience inserts potential climate-induced migration 
into a neoliberal scheme of governance. This ‘new lexicon of security’, as he argues, 
promotes good circulation by fostering the self-help capacities of affected 
populations. He concludes, though, that the bad circulation – those migrants unable 
to sustain themselves and posing potential threats to Western societies – still fall 
under the ban of biopolitics. 
This ban of biopolitics is at the centre of Julian Reid‘s analysis. Reid investigates the 
biopolitical implications also pointed to by Methmann/Rothe and Bettini, comparing, 
in particular, human and non-human migration with regard to discourses about 
population, poverty, and sexual reproduction. Reid observes that ‘while the 
problematization of climate-induced migration among non-human species is inspired 
often by a concern with how to defend and increase their reproductive potentials, in 
the human world it tends to concerned with how to prevent those populations 
endangered by climate change from reproducing’. In order to elucidate this 
conundrum, he juxtaposes the polar bear, a highly iconic species affected by climate 
change, and the ‘illiterate rural poor’, who play a crucial role in Indian development 
discourse. While the latter are being subjected to sterilization projects, polar bears 
are feared to lose their pure reproductive potential, forcing them to mate with grizzly 
bears and thereby driving the polar bear species towards extinction. What unites 
these cases, the argument goes, is ”a desire to conserve pre-existing spaces and 
populations from the potential transformations that the combination of life’s 
movement and reproduction may produce”. And this desire legitimates the violent 
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interventions into populations around the globe. As a conclusion, he draws on the 
work of the French postwar composer, Olivier Messiaen, whosemusic celebrates ‘the 
beauty that emerges through the monstrous mixing of life across the climatic 
boundaries that supposedly determine the security of species’. In this vein, Reid 
argues for reproductive freedom and embracing the change that is inherent to 
climate-induced migration. 
The final contribution by Andrew Baldwin wraps up the issue from a rather novel 
perspective. Acknowledging the tension between liberal and alarmist discourse, the 
different strategies of securitization, the political nature of the climate-induced 
migration discourse, its specific Western design and the role of biopolitical and 
liberal technologies of power, he seeks to highlight the theological imaginaries at 
stake in recent discourses of climate-induced migration. He argues that ‘the figure of 
the climate change migrant comes to represent the otherworldliness or absolute that 
is so central to political theology.’ In line with the other contributions, he 
distinguishes between a sovereign and a liberal approach to climate-induced 
migration, broadly corresponding to the minimalist and maximalist positions. Within 
the sovereign camp, Baldwin detects a ‘prophetic’ imaginary, one which casts the 
climate refugee as a sign for the sins committed by humanity and which calls for the 
nation state to reinforce order to avert an apocalyptic future. For Baldwin, the 
prophetic imaginary carries “a moral injunction to openly and aggressively reorder 
the world and to usher in an alternate global order” (p.??). The liberal variant, by 
contrast, locates ‘the absolute quality of the climate change-induced migrant in the 
immanent, contingent unfolding of the world, rather than in an external time-space 
that characterises the apocalyptic imaginary.’ This political theology justifies a 
neoliberal ethics in which individuals are thought to strive for their own absolution 
through endless effort. Acknowledging these competing theological imaginaries, 
Baldwin contends, ‘opens up a host of questions that allow us to think our world 
differently, questions about what it might to be human in the context of climate 
change and about forging new ways of living and new solidarities in the context of 
climatic uncertainty.’ Not only does this echo Reid‘s call for embracing the change 
brought about by climate change. It also highlights what is at stake when the 
questions raised in this issue are neglected. The debate about climate-induced 
migration is not only an academic debate. It is also a highly political debate, one that 
is centrally focussed on how and with what effects we imagine a world radically 
altered by climate change and how we deal with the anxieties that derive from such 
imaginaries. This special issue is offered as a starting point for this urgently needed 
conversation.  
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